NYLS Law Review
Volume 51
Issue 2 Plaintiffs’ Bar
January 2006

How the Plaintiffs’ Bar Bars Plaintiffs
Richard L. Abel
Cornell Professor of Law at U.C.L.A

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review
Part of the Legal Profession Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard L. Abel, How the Plaintiffs’ Bar Bars Plaintiffs, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 344 (2006-2007).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

Article 6

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-2\NLR204.txt

unknown

Seq: 2

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

9-MAR-07

16:11

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-2\NLR204.txt

unknown

Seq: 3

9-MAR-07

16:11

VOLUME 51 | 2006/07

RICHARD L. ABEL

How the Plaintiffs’ Bar Bars Plaintiffs

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Richard L. Abel is Cornell Professor of Law at U.C.L.A. He has written extensively about both torts and the legal profession.

The New York Law School Plaintiffs’ Bar Symposium focused on the plaintiffs’ bar. Like many of the participants, however, I am ultimately interested in
the bar’s plaintiffs and how they obtain redress.1 In this article, I begin by
asking whether we could dispense with private lawyers. Concluding (reluctantly) that this is politically unfeasible, in part II I analyze the divergence between the interests and capacities of clients and lawyers. In part III, I examine
failures in the two institutions that structure the ways in which clients find and
retain lawyers: the state and the market. In this section, I analyze a variety of
innovative solutions that seek to address these failures: websites that provide
better information to clients, aggregation of clients’ claims, brokering practices
between clients and lawyers, financing arrangements for clients and lawyers,
brokering practices in financing arrangements, and marketizing of claims. In
part IV, I conclude with some (pessimistic) thoughts about the politics of reforming the tort claiming process.
I.

DO PLAINTIFFS NEED LAWYERS?

We should begin by considering the possibility of eliminating lawyers, who
are always expensive (inevitably, given their investment in human capital; deliberately, given the profession’s long history of anti-competitive practices).2
There are two ways of doing so.
A.

Alternatives to Tort

We could abolish some or all tort claims. Victims would be relegated to savings (and loss insurance); tortfeasors would go undeterred and unpunished. Legal
immunities and defenses do this for some torts and to some victims, but even the
most extreme tort “reformers” (i.e., defendants and their hired guns) do not go so
far. Most people have enough savings to subsist for only a few months without
work (even when unencumbered by their additional medical expenses).3 Most

1.

I focus on compensation, even though Myriam Gilles, panelist at New York Law School’s Plaintiffs’ Bar
Symposium and Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, reminds us of Richard
Posner’s dictum that the sole justification for tort law is deterrence. Damages are paid only “as the price of
enlisting their [victims’ and lawyers’] participation in the operation of the system.” Richard A. Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972). Unfortunately, we know almost nothing about
the deterrent effect of tort liability and have ample reason to believe it is far from optimally efficient.
Unlike Posner, I am also interested in the plight of victims; and we do know that delivering compensation can alleviate it.

2.

See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989) [hereinafter ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS];
RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1988) [hereinafter ABEL, LEGAL
P ROFESSION]; RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE: THE POLITICS
OF PROFESSIONALISM (2003) [hereinafter ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS].

3.

In 2002, American households saved only 2.2% of their annual income. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
National Economic Accounts, tbl.2.9, Personal Income and Its Disposition by Households and by
Nonprofit Institutions Serving Households, l.46, available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/
TableView.asp.
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people have little or no private loss insurance,4 and fewer than half have longterm disability insurance.5 Americans are not about to repudiate their exceptionalism and join the rest of the advanced industrialized world in providing an
adequate social welfare system.
Alternatively, we could adopt a strict liability scheme. The obvious model is
workers’ compensation which was motivated, in part, by the goal of dispensing
with lawyers.6 Not surprisingly, they quickly made themselves indispensable
once again. Perhaps there is a principle of conservation of litigious energy — a
first law of juridical dynamics (analogous to that of thermodynamics): eliminate
or reduce litigation over one issue (fault) and lawyers direct their efforts to other
issues (causation and damages).7 In any case, defendants and their insurers and
lawyers strenuously oppose strict liability, endlessly repeating the myths of litigiousness and frivolous claims.8 And they are preaching to the choir: if my firstyear law students are any guide, laypeople have a strong (if unreflective) attachment to the fault principle.9
A variant of the first alternative above would be to allow subrogated insurers, but not victims, to make tort claims.10 This has definite advantages. It
restores deterrence (although moral judgment is compromised when the victim is
not seeking redress). The liability insurers that are presently repeat-player defendants would become repeat-player plaintiffs as loss insurers. They would
have the same monetary incentive as victims (though not the emotional need for
4.

In 2004, 45.8 million people lacked any health insurance. U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage: 2004, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthin04/hlth04asc.html (last visited Nov. 4,
2006).

5.

Only forty-two percent of all full-time employees of medium and large private establishments had longterm disability insurance in 1999. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY:
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999 SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 3
tbl.1, available at http://www.stats.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebtb0001.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).

6.

See generally P HILIPPE NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE
AGENCY (1969) (providing a sociological analysis of workers’ compensation).

IN A

GOVERN-

MENT

7.

At a 1978 conference on plea bargaining, I remember repeated analogies comparing the criminal justice
system to a water bed (a natural metaphor at the time): suppress discretion in one area and it bulges out in
another. Special Issue on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 189 (1979) (listing the participants
of the Plea Bargaining Conference).

8.

See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA,
AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004) (providing a sociological analysis of the creation of a moral panic
about litigiousness); David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 551 (1984) (analyzing tort-claiming behavior
in the rural Midwest).

9.

See Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Fault and Liability for Accidents from the Accident Victim’s Perspective,
in HARRIS ET AL., COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 139–40 (1984).

10. Maurice Rosenberg once proposed that government should assume the task of compensating victims and

aggregating their claims in a suit against tortfeasors. Maurice Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That
Are Civil to Promote Justice That Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797, 813–16 (1971). Given the
growth of American antipathy to government since he wrote this article, it seems more palatable to let
private insurers compete to do this.
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justice, apology, or punishment). Claims would be institutionalized and routine.11 Given the small number of players on both sides, linked in ongoing relationships, an even higher proportion of claims would be settled.12 (Indeed, a
single company would often insure both parties.) Insurers would have greater
bargaining power and, of course, they would be expert in retaining lawyers (inhouse or outside counsel). Defendants would lose the enormous leverage they now
wield over needy victims by stalling.13 (Those who get exercised over the mythic
“tort liability crisis” somehow brush aside the real “tort impunity crisis” — defendants who assert frivolous defenses, stonewall, abuse procedure, file hopeless appeals, misuse bankruptcy, hide behind the corporate veil, or conceal assets or move
them outside the jurisdiction, all to discourage legitimate claims and delay
payment.)
But this proposal also introduces significant problems. It imposes much
higher transaction costs: roughly an extra dollar for every dollar delivered to the
victim.14 More importantly, many victims will have little or no loss insurance.
There is reason to believe that those most likely to be seriously injured (because of
the work they do, the cars they drive, the homes they inhabit, the consumer products they own, the environments in which they live) will be least likely to
purchase loss insurance because they lack discretionary income — or even the
confidence that they can plan for and control their destinies. These differences
will reproduce inequalities not only of class but also of race (and probably age and
gender). We could provide universal coverage through social insurance, but that
is politically unrealistic. And first-party insurance is always less generous than
tort damages, rarely replacing all lost income, and never compensating for intangibles.15 Those deficiencies would obstruct all three tort goals: compensation,
deterrence, and punishment.

11. This is one reason why a much higher proportion of automobile accident victims make more claims than

victims of accidents that occur elsewhere, for example in the workplace or at home. Richard L. Abel, £’s of
Cure, Ounces of Prevention, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (1985).
12. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV.

55, 61–62 (1963).
13. See generally Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996) (discussing how

tortfeasors’ judgment-proofing strategies undermine the liability system).
14. Alfred F. Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REV. 279, 311

(1964). See generally Jeffery O’Connell & Jay Barker, Compensation for Injury & Illness: An Update of the Conard-Morgan Tabulations, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 913 (1986) (providing statistics on claiming behavior and transaction costs); James S. Kakalik & Nicholas M. Pace, Costs and Compensation
Paid in Tort Litigation, 1986 RAND CORP. 1 (providing statistics on claming behavior and accident
costs).
15. However, I have also argued against such compensation. See Richard L. Abel, General Damages Are

Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55
DEP AUL L. REV. 253 (2006).
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Alternatives to Lawyers

If we reject all three alternatives, victims have no choice but to claim in tort
against defendants. Studies of many different kinds of injuries, in both the
United States and the United Kingdom, confirm that only about a tenth of accident victims file claims.16 And in those cases, almost none does so alone. The
jurisdictional limits of small claims courts exclude significant injuries.17 No
layperson can litigate effectively against an institutional defendant in a regular
court. Even Nolo.com, a website dedicated to self-help, advises that “the following types of injuries and accidents almost certainly require a lawyer’s help: longterm or permanently disabling injuries . . . severe injuries . . . medical malpractice . . . toxic exposure” and a catch-all: “when an insurance company refuses to
pay.”18 Independent paraprofessionals might be able to negotiate settlements in
the more routine, less serious cases (for far less than the one-third to one-half
contingent fee charged by lawyers).19 Claims assessors do so in England (referring to lawyers the cases they cannot settle).20 As non-lawyers, furthermore, they
may aggressively seek clients. Needless to say, this provokes fury among solicitors
(who, oxymoronically, cannot solicit). It is hard to imagine the American plaintiffs’ bar — which is much larger, better organized, and wealthier than its English counterpart — tolerating such a breach in its monopoly. The legal
profession has attacked far less serious competitive threats as “unauthorized practice of law.”21 American lawyers want to pocket their contingent fees while
paraprofessional employees do much of the work.22 In any case, American “low16. Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis — Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 448 (1987).
17. In California, an individual cannot recover for more than $7500 in small claims court.

California
Courts, Self-Help Center, Small Claims Basics, How Much Money Can I Ask For?, http://www.court
info.ca.gov/selfhelp/smallclaims/scbasics.htm#howmuch (last visited Oct. 29, 2006). In New York, the
limit on recovery in small claims court is $5000. New York City Small Claims Court, In General, http://
www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/nyc/smallclaims/general.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).

18. Nolo.com, When You Need a Lawyer to Handle Your Personal Injury Claim, http://www.nolo.com/

article.cfm/objectID/6F50E401-DD2F-4F36-ADB1FD1C2BACAA9A/104/199/113/ART/ (last visited
Sept. 6, 2006). Similarly, HALT (“An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform,” formerly “Help
Abolish Legal Tyranny”) urges and assists self-help for many legal problems but not for serious injuries.
Halt.org, http://www.halt.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
19. HERBERT M. KRITZER, R ISKS, REPUTATIONS,
THE

AND

REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN

UNITED STATES 264 (2004).

20. See ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 231–32. The leading innovators, Claims Direct and The

Accident Group, have since folded. Jon Robins, Law: An Accident Waiting to Happen, INDEP., June
10, 2003, at Features.
21. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empir-

ical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981) (critically analyzing
bar association enforcement of unauthorized practice of law restrictions).
22. For example, Carroll Seron describes an entrepreneurial workers’ compensation lawyer on Long Island

who has “forty operators . . . answering questions on about 7,500 open cases . . . . Attorneys take over
only at the point of the hearing.” CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK
LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL-F IRM ATTORNEYS 100 (1996).

349

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-2\NLR204.txt

unknown

Seq: 8

9-MAR-07

16:11

HOW THE PLAINTIFFS’ BAR BARS PLAINTIFFS

level” plaintiffs’ personal injury lawyers already perform such a referral role, as I
discuss below.23
C.

Alternatives to the Market for Lawyers

If lawyers are essential to claiming in tort, we could socialize the costs of
legal representation. For half a century — from the Legal Aid Act of 1948 to the
Access to Justice Act of 1999 (an Orwellian name, since it severely restricted
access) — English legal aid paid private practitioners to represent tort victims
(recovering most of the expense from liable defendants under cost-shifting
rules).24 That still let the client choose a lawyer (a quality control problem). Although the English Legal Aid Board (now the Legal Services Commission, commonly referred to as “LSC”) had the power to regulate quality (as well as cost), it
made little effort to do so, especially since it lacked the client’s incentive. In the
United States, what little legal aid remains after twenty-five years of Republican attacks on the Legal Services Corporation has always excluded fee-generating
work like personal injuries (at the insistence of private practitioners).25 It is
politically inconceivable to challenge this exclusion given the profitability of contingent fees. Even if it were possible, the employed lawyers who deliver legal aid
in the United States would lack the contingent fee incentive for zealous advocacy
(if also the perverse incentive to settle prematurely).26

23. J EROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS

ON

THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO

75 (1962).
24. See ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 293–353. At its inception, English legal aid covered

eighty percent of the population; even after the ravages of both Conservative and Labour governments,
the legal aid covered about half of the population.
25. The 2006 LSC budget was just $327 million; controlled for inflation, that is about forty percent of its

highpoint in 1980 (President Carter’s last year). Legal Services Corporation, Press Releases, LSC Requests $411.8 Million for FY 2007 (Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://www.lsc.gov.press/pr_detail_T7_
R17.php. In England, which long reviled American contingent fee lawyers as “cowboys,” the Labour
government used conditional fees to justify eliminating legal aid for all money cases. See ABEL, ENGLISH
LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 294–95.
26. On the distortions of contingent fees, see generally Kevin M. Clermont & John Currivan, Improving on

the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529 (1978); Bruce L. Hay, Optimal Contingent Fees in a
World of Settlement, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1997); Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Impact of Fee
Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 251 (1985); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency
Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987); and Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B.
Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN L.
REV. 1125 (1970) (demonstrating divergence between interests of lawyer and client). Economic modelers
argue that contingent fees allow both clients and lawyers to signal the quality of the case and choose the
optimal mix of those fees and hourly rates or fixed retainers. Daniel F. Rubinfeld & Suzanne Scotchmer,
Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis, 24 RAND J. ECON. 343 (1993). In fact,
virtually all personal injury cases are taken on contingent fees, and the percentages are strikingly uniform.
KRITZER, supra note 19, at 39 tbl.2.4, 264.
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MAPPING THE INTERESTS AND CAPACITIES OF CLIENTS AND LAWYERS

That leaves the onus on the injured victim to choose and instruct a lawyer.27
This generates a number of problems. One way to map them is to contrast the
interests and capacities of clients and lawyers.
A.

Choice

Clients want to choose from a range of lawyers: more than one, but not too
many. (Manufacturers and retailers know that excessive choice depresses consumption; information overload compels satisficing.)28 While rural areas and
small towns offer too few choices,29 the metropolis offers far too many.30
Lawyers want to choose clients rather than be chosen by them. Lawyers
want an exclusive source of business, i.e., protection from competition with other
lawyers,31 and perhaps a filter to weed out junk cases.32
B.

Information about Quality

Clients want information about lawyer quality (in order to maximize likelihood of success and size of award). The asymmetries generated by the division
of labor (which gave rise to the legal profession in the first place) make such
information difficult to acquire, especially since the quality of services (unlike that
of products) is better assessed ex post than ex ante. Clients are likely to place
undue reliance on inputs such as credentials (which is why lawyers display
framed university diplomas and bar admission certificates on their walls), process
27. On the importance of victims actively participating in the pursuit of their claims, see generally DOUGLAS

E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? (1974) (providing a sociological analysis of
lawyer-client relations in tort cases).
28. See Barry Schwartz, Hazel Rose & Alana Conner Snibbe, Is Freedom Just Another Word for Many

Things to Buy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at 14; see also BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF
CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004) (arguing that greater choice can hurt consumers). See generally
Barry Schwartz, Andrew Ward, Sonja Lyubomorsky, John Monterosso, Katherine White & Darrin R.
Lehman, Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness is a Matter of Choice, 83 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178 (2002).
29. See generally DONALD LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT

OF

CONTEXT

ON

PROFESSIONAL

P RACTICE (1990).
30. The Yellow Pages for any major city list thousands of lawyers and provide no useful distinctions.
31. Some nineteenth century professions required a potential competitor to obtain permission from the client’s

previous professional service provider before offering services. Like other feudal status relationships, this
one lasted for a lifetime — and often across generations. There are still vestiges of that practice. Kritzer
reports that a Wisconsin firm depending heavily on referrals “jealously guards its relationships with referring lawyers, to the point that if a client previously referred by another lawyer directly contacts the firm
about a new case, the firm will ask the client to go back through the original lawyer.” KRITZER, supra
note 19, at 60.
32. What one of Sara Parikh’s informants called “piece-of-shit cases, excuse my language.” Sara Parikh,

Professionalism and Its Discontents: A Study of Social Networks in the Plaintiff’s Personal Injury Bar
124 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago) (on file with author).
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(the legal equivalent of bedside manner),33 outcomes/recoveries (which do not
control for the other factors of production: evidence of liability and magnitude of
damages), and the visible accoutrements of success (office address and furnishings,
the lawyer’s clothes and car, media publicity). Some clients want second opinions;
but all lawyers may offer overly optimistic predictions in order to get business.
Lawyers want to maximize their attractiveness while concealing deficiencies. (That is one reason why the profession denies the public access to information about client complaints to disciplinary bodies.) Lawyers want to control the
information available to clients; they resent second opinions (an act of lèse
majesté, which appears to question their judgment). They want accurate information about the strength and value of the client’s case, which clients have an
incentive to exaggerate.
C.

Information about Cost

Clients want to minimize cost. If they engage in comparison shopping,
they are likely to give excessive weight to price (which can be estimated in advance) without being able to judge the quality tradeoff (because this cannot be
determined until after the fact, and even then cannot be measured without controls for inputs). Alternatively, clients may mistake a high price as a reliable
signal of quality.34
Lawyers want to maximize profit, i.e., obtaining a return on their investment of capital, overhead, and especially time. This creates many possibly perverse incentives affecting case selection, substitution of capital for labor,
delegation to nonprofessionals, premature settlement (because of diminishing return on additional hours invested), and package deals with insurers (selling big
cases short to get more for small ones).35 Lawyers do not want to quote prices to
clients in advance.36 They detest clients who shop around. Moreover, there is
virtually NO price competition in contingent fees.
D. Who Waits for Whom
Clients want lawyers available on demand but do not want to pay when
not using them. (The English Bar claimed that as an advantage over both a
unified profession and employed advocates.)
33. “When asked the question, ‘How can someone tell if he has chosen a very competent lawyer?’ . . . 30% (22

of 59) said by his manner once you have met him. . . .” ROSENTHAL, supra note 27 at 130.
34. When he was practicing law in Los Angeles, Richard Nixon observed with his usual cynicism: “I never

realized how easy it is to make money. I just got twenty-five thousand dollars for telling a bunch of
stupid jerks something they could have learned from the newspapers,” that “France will remain stable as
long as de Gaulle’s in power.” P AUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
GREAT WALL STREET LAW FIRMS 100 (1973).
35. R OSENTHAL, supra note 28, at 103. See generally H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE

SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1980) (analyzing insurance claims adjustment).
36. See ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 361–63.
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Lawyers (like doctors or contractors) want a queue of waiting clients. (But
in order to ensure a steady flow of work, barristers’ clerks overbook, often requiring them to return a brief to the solicitor’s firm on the eve of trial.)37
E. Responsiveness and Speed
Clients want to be kept informed of the progress of their cases and get quick
results. (Failures in both areas provoke clients’ most frequent complaints.)38
Lawyers want to control the information available to clients: “Don’t call me,
I’ll call you.” They want to invest their time where it will produce the highest
returns for themselves, not the quickest results for clients. They tend to blame
delays on the legal system.
F. Billing
Clients want transparent bills and a means of questioning charges.39
Lawyers want clients who pay without challenging the one-line statement
“for services rendered.”
III.

MATCHING THE INTERESTS OF CLIENTS AND LAWYERS

A.

Collective Failures

Two institutions determine whether clients get what they want: the state
and the market. Although laissez-faire ideologues oppose all regulation, some
regulation is necessary since the information asymmetry that justifies professions
also introduces serious imperfections into the market for legal services. However,
existing regulation does a poor job of both correcting those imperfections and
maximizing quality while minimizing price. Entry barriers have more to do
with occupational rent-seeking behavior than with ensuring competence and integrity.40 Neither professional discipline nor malpractice liability does a good job
of preventing or correcting misconduct or negligence.41 Peer pressures are as

37. See ABEL, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 2, at 188.
38. Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in Filene’s Basement, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1449, 1495 tbl.1

(2006).
39. The English Law Society required all solicitors’ firms to establish an internal mechanism for handling

complaints and to inform clients about it. Christa Christensen, Suzanne Day & Jane Worthington,
Learned Profession? — The Stuff of “Sherry Talk”: The Response to Practice Rule 15, 6 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 27 (1999).
40. See generally MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY

OR RESTRICTING
COMPETITION? (Upjohn Inst. ed., 2006) (analyzing the anti-competitive effects of licensing laws).

41. ABEL, ENGLISH

LAWYERS,

supra note 2, at 335; ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 143.
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likely to encourage bad conduct as good.42 In any case, much of the plaintiffs’ bar
practices alone43 and much of the harmful behavior is invisible to other lawyers.
Law could emulate medicine (as it often does)44 by institutionalizing de
facto specialization. But there is still the problem of measuring competence and
integrity. How predictive are input measures, like experience and formal examination? (As far as I know, there has never been any attempt to validate the
entry barriers to the legal profession by empirically testing correlations between
law school or bar exam grades and lawyer performance.) Process measures, like
file review, may be the most accurate, but they are also the most expensive to
apply and tend to accentuate what can be counted.45 Outcome measures — like
those that open the door to the Inner Circle of Advocates and the Richard Grand
Society — may simply reflect chance (the injury victim’s bad luck, the lawyer’s
good luck) and certainly do not demonstrate good, much less excellent, performance.46 General practitioners resent and resist any certification that places them
at a competitive disadvantage, sometimes demanding that they be grandfathered
in.47 And any additional entry barrier (even mere certification) has the potential
to extract further monopoly rents.

42. J EROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS: A SURVEY

OF THE

NEW YORK CITY BAR 96–116 (1966).

43. Nearly half of all private practitioners are solo, which is more than a third of all lawyers. CLARA N.

CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000 tbls.6 & 7 (2004).
Fifty-six percent of Rosenthal’s sample practiced alone or with one other lawyer. ROSENTHAL, supra note
27, at 133. A 1995 survey of Wisconsin contingent-fee lawyers found that they worked in firms whose
median size was six lawyers; only five percent worked in firms of fifty or more. KRITZER, supra note 19,
at 29.
44. In the 1920s American lawyers sought to do a “Flexner.” The ABA persuaded the Carnegie Commission,

which had previously produced the Flexner report recommending drastic cuts in the number of new doctors, to fund a similar study of lawyers. But the investigator, Alfred Z. Reed, urged the profession to
recognize that two distinct tiers of lawyers served different clienteles. Disgusted, the ABA commissioned
Elihu Root to produce the report it wanted and then used it to justify raising entry barriers. ABEL,
AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 46.
45. See Avrom Sherr, Assessing the Quality of Legal Work: Measuring Process, 1 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF.

135, 143–44 (1994). See generally AVROM SHERR, RICHARD MOORHEAD & ALAN PATERSON, LAW— THE QUALITY AGENDA: ASSESSING AND DEVELOPING COMPETENCE AND QUALITY IN LEGAL
AID (1994) (developing and testing measures of lawyer quality).

YERS

46. In 1972 Richard D. Grand secured the highest pain and suffering damages ever awarded: $2.5 million for

a severely burned engineering graduate student with a wife and baby. See Wry v. Dial, 503 P.2d 979
(Ariz. App. Ct. 1972). (I have taught that case for thirty years to illustrate the subjectivity of juror
evaluations.) Grand celebrated his victory by inviting lawyers who had won a million dollars to join his
“Inner Circle of Advocates,” whose logo featured a “7,” representing their “seven-figure verdict[s].” Inner
Circle, http://www.innercircle.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2006). To ensure exclusivity, he subsequently
limited membership to 100. A quarter-century later he founded a similar organization of “pre-eminent
personal injury and medical malpractice lawyers” in the U.K., modestly naming it “The Richard Grand
Society.” Richard Grand Society, http://www.richardgrandsociety.com (last visted Oct. 27, 2006).
47. For an account of a struggle between inclusion and exclusion, see ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS, supra note 2,

at 226–29.
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Market Failures

That leaves clients dependent on the market. This concluding section will
evaluate existing mechanisms and consider some alternatives. Defendants, unlike plaintiffs, are adequately served by the market.48 They are repeat players.
They can reduce costs by employing paraprofessionals (e.g., claims adjusters).49
In-house counsel has the expertise to evaluate the performance of outside counsel
and the bargaining power to negotiate lower fees (such as reverse contingent fees)
and force lawyers to compete in beauty parades to get their business. The middle
class once had family lawyers (just as they had family doctors). Only the wealthy
have either today.50 The average American uses a lawyer only twice in a lifetime.51 Half of Americans report never having had a serious tort problem.52
Only about a fourth of those who report having had a serious tort problem saw a
lawyer. 53 Individuals do not like to anticipate the unpleasant events that force
them to consult lawyers: arrest, deportation, eviction, debt collection, IRS audits,
job loss, bankruptcy, injury, divorce, death. Lawyers had reputations in smallscale face-to-face societies (although the information may have been inaccurate or
irrelevant, and choice was more limited).54 English solicitors still know something about barristers’ reputations. But few Americans have any meaningful
knowledge about the competence of personal injury lawyers. Personal injury clients emerge from the encounter with their lawyers with a far worse impression
than those who consult lawyers about any other problem.55 This negative judgment extends across every dimension of performance: keeping clients informed of
progress, paying attention, charging fair fees, being prompt, interested and honest, and providing full explanations.56 But even experienced clients only know
about the one or two lawyers they have used, not the other 99.99%.
Lawyer referral services allocate clients to lawyers. But because the schemes
are run by professional associations, they suppress competition by choosing lawyers randomly (usually in alphabetical order), without screening for competence

48. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Commodification of Insurance Defense Practice, VAND. L. REV. (forthcom-

ing 2007).
49. See generally R OSS, supra note 35.
50. “After their accident, a mere twenty percent (twelve of fifty-nine) of the clients consulted with an attorney

they had used before, whom they thought of as their ‘family lawyer.’ ” ROSENTHAL, supra note 27, at
128–29.
51. BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS

OF THE

52. Id. at 102, 103 tbl.4.8.
53. Id. at 103. Compare fig.4.1 with fig.5.14.
54. See generally LANDON, supra note 29.
55. CURRAN, supra note 51, at 198 fig.5.17.
56. Id. at 213 fig.5.23.
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or fitness.57 Prepaid legal service plans limit clients to those lawyers who sign
up. Because legal insurance almost always is a fringe benefit of employment,
clients have no say about which lawyers belong to the plans and little information
to guide clients in choosing among lawyer members.58 In any case, such plans
usually exclude personal injuries because of the availability of contingent fees.
The Internet has privatized referral services. Although the new technology
is free, fast, and available to anyone with on-line access, it has its own severe
limitations. Martindale-Hubbell allows victims to seek a lawyer by tort and
location. But a search using the terms “automobile accidents” and “Los Angeles”
produced 114 listings, with little useful information to guide victims in choosing
among them (or an explanation why the tens of thousands of other Los Angeles
lawyers were excluded).59 Typing “personal injury lawyer” into Google produced
ninety-one million results. But few tort victims are likely to go beyond the sponsored links and websites on the first page. Unlike Martindale-Hubbell, which
purports to encompass most practitioners (if it does not make referrals to all of
them), other websites favor a few lawyers. The fact that the same ones appear on
several sites strongly suggests that they pay to be there. PersonalInjuryFYI.com
lists only three firms in all of Los Angeles: Booth & Koskoff (which boasts of
having collected over $283 million), Vieira Trial Law, and the Law Offices of
Cavalluzzi & Cavalluzzi.60 PersonalInjuryLawyerShop.com lists the same
three.61 AccidentNetwork.com refers to a single law firm in all of Los Angeles
and Orange Counties.62 A few sites let even casual visitors (like me) learn that
lawyers can buy referrals.63 PersonalInjuryLawOffices.com promises lawyers
“an exclusive listing and a guarantee that our keywords will remain a first page57. See BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE

OF MODERATE MEANS 173–204 (1970); R OSENsupra note 27, at 140–41. The California State Bar website lists twenty-six lawyer referral
services for Los Angeles County. California State Bar, http://www.calbar.ca.gov (last visited Oct. 28,
2006). When I checked the service for my own city, Santa Monica, it promised that “[a]ll lawyers are
carefully screened and meet both State bar and LRIS experience requirements.” Santa Monica Bar Association, http://www.smba.net (last visted Oct. 28, 2006).

THAL,

58. See generally F. RAYMOND MARKS, ROBERT P. HALLAUER & ROBERT R. CLIFTON, THE SHREVEPORT

P LAN: AN EXPERIMENT

IN THE

DELIVERY

OF

LEGAL SERVICES (1974).

59. Find a Lawyer, http://www.lawyers.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2006). An earlier study of personal injury

lawyers found that only two of the sixty-two were rated by Martindale. ROSENTHAL, supra note 27, at
136. There were nearly 140,000 lawyers in California in 2005. American Bar Association, National
Lawyer Population by State, http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/2006_national%20_lawyer_population_survey.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2006). A guesstimate would put at least 50,000 in greater Los
Angeles. Hence, Martindale offered information about only 0.2% (although not all practice personal injury law).
60. Personal Injury, http://www.personalinjuryfyi.com/search/zip.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
61. Injury Lawyer Shop, http://www.injurylawyershop.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
62. Accident Network, http://www.accidentnetwork.com/attorneys_California.html (last visited Sept. 25,

2006).
63. Injury Board, http://www.injuryboard.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
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sponsored link for the duration of the agreement.”64 PersonalInjuryLawyers.com
promises to “help drive traffic to your law practice and/or website by ranking on
the first page of results for many terms which encompass Personal Injury Law.”65
“We limit the number of law firms to one per metro area or one per state. This
model eliminates any conflict from your completion [sic] and maximizes the number of contacts. Simple idea, right?” Right: it lists a single Santa Ana firm for all
of California (with 140,000 lawyers).66 InjuryBoard.com lists just seventy-four
firms throughout the state.67 TotalInjury.com simply offers a toll free number
with no information about the lawyers it uses.68 Several other sites ask potential
clients to describe their cases but say nothing about the lawyers to whom they
make referrals.69 These web-based referrals are worse than useless. They mislead clients into believing that they assure quality. They drastically narrow the
range of alternatives in response to lawyer interests. Most victims would do
better relying on the experience of acquaintances — or even picking randomly.70
The Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Bates 71 allowed lawyers to advertise,
although the Court’s 1993 decision in Went for It 72 upheld the Florida Bar’s
prohibition on mail to victims within thirty days of an accident. But advertising
tells clients little about competence, price, speed, or responsiveness.73 Indeed,
many states discourage price advertising. Furthermore, legal advertising is inefficient: most of the audience either has no present need for legal services or is
ignorant of that need and hence disregards the information; those aware of their
64. Personal Injury Law Offices, http://www.personalinjurylawoffices.com/forlawyers.html (last visited

Sept. 25, 2006).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Injury Board, http://www.injuryboard.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
68. Total Injury, http://www.totalinjury.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
69. E.g., Legal Connection, Personal Injury Lawyer, http://www.legalconnection.com/personal-injury.html

(last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
70. “Generally speaking, clients choose the first lawyer they know who comes to mind, the first lawyer recom-

mended to them, or the first lawyer they meet.” ROSENTHAL, supra note 27, at 129.
71. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
72. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995).
73. See generally Stewart Macaulay, Lawyer Advertising: Yes But . . . , in INSTITUTE

FOR LEGAL STUDWORKING PAPERS (Ser. 1, Working Paper No. 2, 1986) (analyzing the limited value of lawyer
advertising for consumers), available at http://www.law.wisc.edu/facstaff/macaulay/papers/lawyer_advertising.pdf; Timothy J. Muris & Fred S. McChesney, Advertising and the Price and Quality
of Legal Services: The Case of Legal Clinics, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 179 (1979). Consider the
following poster: “The Law Offices of C. Conrad Claus” (superimposed over a sword). “Former Las Vegas
Deputy District Attorney” and “Former LVMPD in Service Training.” Claus does criminal defense,
constitutional law, family and juvenile law, personal injury, and traffic violations/DUI. His photo shows
a shaved head, goatee, black shirt, big rings — not someone you’d want to meet in a dark alley — or a
courtroom. His slogan is “LET ME GO TO WAR FOR YOU.” His website is www.lawiswar.com; his
phone number is 384-4WAR. Law Offices of C. Conrad Claus, http://www.lawiswar.com (last visited
Sept. 9, 2006).

IES:
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need are unlikely to hear from most advertisers.74 Targeted solicitation of accident victims would be a much more efficient and effective means of educating
them about their legal rights, but the Supreme Court upheld the Ohio ban on
solicitation in Ohralik.75 I oppose that ban, but I see no prospect of overturning
it. Some lawyers flout the prohibition, engaging in overt or covert ambulance
chasing. Because such conduct is illegal, they presumably charge clients a vice tax
for running the risk of exposure (discipline and criminal prosecution)76 and pay
kickbacks to the intermediaries: police, tow truck operators, ambulance drivers,
and healthcare providers.77 But most competent lawyers will not take such
chances. Indeed, specialist associations of the plaintiffs’ bar (which enroll the
more competent practitioners) may impose their own, more stringent restraints
on solicitation.78 Given the limits of advertising and the ban on solicitation,
clients seek information about legal rights and lawyer referrals from networks of
friends and relatives (for the middle class), fellow workers and unions, neighbors,
churches, and ethnic groups.79 Such sources are likely to be least effective for the
most common injuries, which occur outside the workplace and off the roads.80
Mass tort victims sometimes form support groups, but organizing the dispersed
victims of defective products entails very high transaction costs.81 At best, these
referral sources satisfice, ruling out the patently incompetent or dishonest; however, these informants rarely know more than one or two lawyers and little or
nothing about their competence compared with the rest of the bar.82
74. A survey of Wisconsin contingency fee lawyers reported that less than one percent of their cases came from

direct mail and just three percent from advertising. KRITZER, supra note 19, at 48.
75. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
76. See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS

OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968) (arguing that
many criminal laws merely increase the price of the forbidden goods and services).

77. See generally BAXTER WARD, ILLEGAL ATTORNEY REFERRAL ACTIVITY

IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY
(1974); Kenneth J. Reichstein, Ambulance Chasing: A Case Study of Deviation and Control Within
the Legal Profession, 13 SOC. PROBS. 3 (1965) (empirically demonstrating the prevalence of ambulance
chasing).

78. The American Trial Lawyers Association prohibited members from contacting potential clients or even

visiting the scene of an accident unless requested. David Margolick, Trouble in the Trial Bar: A Lawyers’ Group Chases After Ambulance Chasers, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1990, at B6.
79. See generally Jack Ladinsky, The Traffic in Legal Services: Lawyer-Seeking Behavior and the

Channeling of Clients, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 207 (1976) (providing an empirical study of how clients
choose lawyers).
80. See generally Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 9.
81. See generally MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN,

AND THE DALKON
SHIELD (1985) (demonstrating the difficulty of organizing women injured by Dalkon Shield); SUSAN L.
P ERRY & JIM DAWSON, NIGHTMARE: WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985).

82. “Many putative knowledgeables are not in fact very well informed about either personal legal problem

solving or the professional standing of the attorneys they refer people to.” ROSENTHAL, supra note 27, at
131.
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INNOVATIVE MARKET SOLUTIONS

Given the inadequacy of all the existing mechanisms for helping tort victims, I want to speculate about others that are just emerging or are purely
conceptual.
A.

The Market for Information about Lawyers

A disinterested organization could evaluate the quality of legal service providers, much the way Consumers Union rates products (on the basis of its own
tests)83 or Zagat critiques restaurants (based on diners’ opinions). Angie’s List
collects consumer evaluations of services, but it presently serves only eighty-five
cities (with another two coming soon); and though it covers more than three
hundred services (including accountants and financial planning), it does not evaluate lawyers (or doctors).84 More recent entrants — including InsiderPages,
Zipingo, Judy’s Book, and Yelp — also exclude lawyers.85 It is more difficult to
establish quality standards for services than for goods. Jacoby & Meyers, Hyatt
Legal Services, and other legal clinics sought to standardize the quality and price
of services like divorce and bankruptcy, but they deliberately excluded personal
injury as too individualized.86 The crude mortality and morbidity rates hospitals
are required to report do little more than identify the most egregious examples of
mistreatment (and do not control for differences in patient population). Neither a
lawyer’s win:loss ratio nor the size of a judgment means anything without
knowledge about inputs. Professionals successfully keep secret disciplinary complaints that do not eventuate in serious punishment. Anyone who published
evaluations of lawyer quality would have to be prepared to defend against business defamation lawsuits, even ill-founded ones.87
B.

Aggregating Victims

Accident victims are classic examples of one-shot players in the legal system
because most serious injuries are random, dispersed, and infrequent.88 Indeed,
83. Consumer Reports, http://www.consumerreports.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
84. Angie’s List, http://www.angieslist.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
85. InsiderPages, http://www.insiderpages.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); Zipingo, http://www.zipingo.

com (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); Judy’s Book, http://www.judysbook.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); Yelp,
http://www.yelp.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); see Damon Darlin, Let’s Say Your Toilet Backs Up,
How Do You Find a Good Plumber?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2006, at B1.
86. See generally J ERRY VAN HOY, FRANCHISE LAW FIRMS

AND THE TRANSFORMATION
LEGAL SERVICES (1997) (providing a sociological analysis of legal clinics).

OF

PERSONAL

87. For example, Parkslopeparents.com was threatened by a child care provider after a parent posted criticism

of the quality of their lawyer. Motoko Rich, For Online Parents’ Group, A Legal Scare, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2005, at 38. Websites might find some protection in anti-SLAPP statutes. See GEORGE W.
P RING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 217 (1996).
88. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of

Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1975) (a classic article on the advantages of repeat players).

359

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-2\NLR204.txt

unknown

Seq: 18

9-MAR-07

16:11

HOW THE PLAINTIFFS’ BAR BARS PLAINTIFFS

repeat players would be suspect.89 It might be possible to aggregate some victims.
Class actions are one means, but federal courts are increasingly hostile to them,
especially for personal injury claims.90 Voluntary associations, such as trade unions, automobile clubs, recreational associations, and neighborhood groups, can
play an informational role, but claims remain individual. Members of the plaintiffs’ bar themselves are repeat players: accumulating expertise, routinizing work,
confronting the same adversaries in the same fora, possessing a stake in the outcome extending beyond the particular case. Although a few firms are highly capitalized as a result of the obscene contingent fees earned in mass tort cases
(especially asbestos and tobacco), and many workers’ compensation mills employ
large numbers of paralegals, most plaintiffs’ firms remain very small and thinly
capitalized (compared with their adversaries representing corporate defendants
and insurance companies). This fragmentation undoubtedly has multiple causes:
aggressive litigators are highly individualistic; lawyers are very possessive about
their clients and cases; co-counsel squabble about divvying up profits. And there
are few economies of scale in litigating individual tort cases (unlike mass torts).
C.

Tort Lawyering Brokers

Brokers could mediate between clients and lawyers, as they do in many other
markets, such as labor, real estate, automobiles, travel, entertainment, insurance,
used goods (consignment stores), art, and literary works. As repeat players, brokers would be well positioned to acquire good information about lawyer competence and integrity. But this would introduce the usual agency problems: brokers
in ongoing relationships with lawyers would maximize self-interest at the expense of victims, with whom they have only transitory contacts. (Insurance brokers, who have a fiduciary duty to find the best deal for their clients, also risk
capture by the insurance industry.) Furthermore, the Internet is supplanting
human agents: Travelocity and Expedia for travel; Redfin, ZipRealty, and BuySideInc for real estate.91
Lawyers already perform the broker role between clients and litigators. The
divided legal profession in England (and some of its former colonies) institutionalized referrals between solicitors (to whom, alone, clients had direct access) and
barristers (who, until recently, enjoyed exclusive rights of audience in the higher
Those who reported having experienced a serious tort had a lifetime mean of 1.3 personal injuries and 2.0
property damages. CURRAN, supra note 51, at 102, 103 tbl.4.8.
89. Even to the lawyers who represent them. Kritzer reports a lawyer saying: “I just had a client come back. I

settled his auto case, and now he got hit by a car as a pedestrian. You find . . . that the same people have
accidents over and over. . . .” KRITZER, supra note 19, at 62.
90. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
91. Travelocity, http://www.travelocity.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); Expedia, http://www.expedia.com

(last visited Oct. 26, 2006); Redfin, http://www.redfin.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); ZipRealty, http:/
/www.ZipRealty.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); BuySideInc, http://www.BuySideInc.com (last visited
Oct. 26, 2006).
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courts).92 The agency problem was summed up in the exhortation to barristers:
thou shalt not hug a solicitor.93 Barristers responded by delegating this “dirty
work”94 to their clerks, chosen in part for their ability to hold their alcohol and
spend hours in pubs drinking with solicitors who might send them business.95
Although the United States does not divide its lawyers into de jure professional
categories, American low-level personal injury practitioners have referred cases
to higher-level litigators since at least the 1950s.96 Sara Parikh and Herbert
Kritzer confirm that this practice persists a half-century later.97
Economists, who usually start with an assumption of perfect competition,
initially argued that referrals would always benefit clients.98 One empirical
study found that lawyers to whom cases were referred secured much higher recoveries than those who obtained cases directly from clients.99 But that, of course,
may reflect selection bias rather than greater effort or competence. Indeed, we
know (not surprisingly) that larger cases are more likely to be referred.100 More
sophisticated economic analysis has shown that referral does not assure clients
better results.101
92. See generally ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS, supra note 2.
93. See Robert Hazel, Introduction to the Bar, in THE BAR ON TRIAL 17, 17–19 (Robert Hazel ed., 1978).
94. The phrase was coined by Everett Hughes. See , e.g., Everett C. Hughes, Good People and Dirty

Work, 10 SOC. PROBS. 3–10 (1962).
95.

JOHN FLOOD, BARRISTERS’ CLERKS: THE LAW’S MIDDLEMEN 109–11 (1983).

96. CARLIN, supra note 23, at 75. Upper level practitioners obtained better results for their clients. R OSENTHAL,

supra note 27, at 134.

97. See Parikh, supra note 32, at 124. See generally K RITZER, supra note 19. Stephen J. Spurr attributed

a decline between 1972 and 1984 in the proportion of Manhattan and Bronx personal injury cases referred from other lawyers to four factors: advertising, no-fault, an increase in the number of lawyers per
capita, and an increase in the proportion of cases not involving automobile accidents. Stephen J. Spurr,
The Impact of Advertising and Other Factors on Referral Practices, With Special Reference to
Lawyers, 21 RAND J. ECON. 235, 239–40 (1990). Two of these seem unconvincing: the decrease began
well before advertising, and relatively few cases are obtained through it; lawyers quickly found ways
around no-fault. Furthermore, I would have expected a higher proportion of referrals in non-auto cases,
which require more specialized expertise. I think the likeliest explanation is Spurr’s observation that the
profession grew rapidly, and young lawyers lack referring partners.
98. Mark V. Pauly, The Ethics and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting, 10 BELL J. ECON. 344,

358 (1979).
99. Stephen J. Spurr, Referral Practices Among Lawyers: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 13 LAW

& SOC. INQUIRY 87, 107–08 (1988).
100. Parikh, supra note 32, at 123.
101. See Bruce L. Hay, The Economics of Lawyer Referrals 32 (Harvard Law School, John M. Olin

Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 203, 1996) (stating that “when lawyer
profits and net client recovery are negatively correlated” a client cannot “design a referral fee that aligns
her interests with the lawyer’s”). Furthermore, two factors tug in opposite directions. The client wants to
encourage a referral to the best possible lawyer; this is best achieved by requiring the lawyers to use
contingent share arrangement. But the client also wants to encourage hard work on the part of the referee
lawyer; this is best achieved by requiring the lawyers to use simple up-front payment. Id. at 59.
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What do we know about actual referral patterns among lawyers? First,
lawyers are accustomed to splitting fees, whether or not ethical rules allow it (as
they do in forty states), paying a third to a half to the referring lawyer.102 Second, although economists tend to presuppose that anonymous actors maximize
individual (usually short-term) advantage through transitory transactions, sociologists consistently reconfirm Stewart Macaulay’s finding103 that much market
interaction occurs within ongoing relationships.104
Sara Parikh’s research on sixty-two Chicago personal injury lawyers practicing in 1998–2000 offers the best account.105 She makes it clear that lawyers
prefer personal patronage to the impersonal market. One informant said:106
I think if you were to ask most plaintiff PI attorneys who have a desire
to have a respected reputation in Chicago, given their druthers . . . I
think, to a person, they’d say they’d rather not have to advertise . . . .
Having a good, strong referral base means that you don’t have to do
the other things that most attorneys desiring respect would want to
avoid: advertising, chasing, having to work really hard . . . .

These referral dyads are highly stable, lasting an average of ten years for low-end
practitioners and seventeen to nineteen for upper.107 Most grow out of an existing non-economic relationship (rather than representing a systematic search for
the “best” attorney) and retain a social component.108 Case recipients make frequent gifts to referring partners.109 (This sounds strikingly like the patterns of
pre-capitalist exchange, which Malinowski described in the Trobriand Islands
and Mauss further theorized.)110 Half of low-end lawyers and forty percent at
the high-end engage in reciprocal referrals.111 In order to ensure continuing referrals, a lawyer to whom a referred client brought an unrelated matter years
102. CARLIN, supra note 23, at 69, 81–82, 162–63; R OSENTHAL, supra note 27, at 100. Before the Model

Rules were amended to allow this in 1983, fees had to be proportioned to the work done by the referring
lawyer — a rule that was easy to evade.
103. See generally Macaulay, supra note 12.
104. See Wayne E. Baker, Market Networks and Corporate Behavior, 96 AM. J. SOC. 589, 594 (1990); see

also Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35, 52 (1997). See generally Wayne E. Baker, The Social Structure of a
National Securities Market, 89 AM. J. SOC. 775 (1984) (discussing social structural influences on
markets).
105. See generally Parikh, supra note 32.
106. Id. at 143.
107. Id. at 126.
108. Id. at 126–28.
109. Id. at 161. They even do so to non-lawyers, although they realize this violates ethical rules. Id. at 163.

And they feel demeaned by it: “We don’t kiss ass . . . .” Id.
110. See BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS

AND

THE GIFT 26 (1954).
111. Parikh, supra note 32, at 56, 128 tbl.XVIII.
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later sent the client back to the referring lawyer (who could thereby earn another
fee for referring the case again).112
Referring lawyers satisfice.113 Parikh describes one Chicago lawyer who
said: “If you find one firm, it’s a lot easier . . . to make one phone call to find out
how these fifteen cases are doing, rather than having to remember, ‘okay, three I
sent to this firm, five to this firm, seven to this firm.’ ”114 Another agreed: “Shopping, I don’t see much of that. I would imagine like any business over the course
of years, people will try something new and if they’re happy with it, they’ll
stay.”115 Lawyers tend to be equally undiscriminating in the referrals they accept: “I probably take cases I shouldn’t . . . . When your clients are other lawyers,
you have to do whatever it’s going to take to keep them sending you cases.”116
Only a third to a fifth of referrals come from other personal injury lawyers (who
presumably are better able to evaluate quality than generalists or specialists in
other fields).117 The few African American personal injury lawyers in Chicago
tended to refer to each other.118 Although referrals up the hierarchy are always
reciprocated with fee splitting, those down the hierarchy may not be.119 Some
low-end practitioners engage in heavy advertising and then refer all their claims
(or at least the vast majority that do not settle quickly).120 Instead of retiring
completely, some older practitioners just stop trying cases, referring whatever
they cannot settle.121
The dyads are often symbiotic: the referrer is “the guy [the client] could talk
to,” the recipient “the mouthpiece, or the person with the expertise.”122 Indeed,
the referrer may be able to prevent a client from being stolen from the recipient
by a competitor (to whom an unmediated client would be lost).123 But the recipient does not want the referrer to interfere in case management.124 Recipients feel
an obligation to deliver the split fee to the referring lawyer “as quickly as possible,” fearing that a dissatisfied source “may shop around for higher turnover.”125
112. Id. at 154.
113. See generally Herbert Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV.

(PAPERS & PROC.) 1 (1978) (a classic statement on satisficing).
114. Parikh, supra note 32, at 152.
115. Id. at 153–54.
116. Id. at 162.
117. Id. at 129, 131 tbl.XIX.
118. Id. at 132.
119. Id. at 134. Some of the latter are intended to help struggling novices. Id. at 139–40.
120. Id. at 138.
121. Id. at 141.
122. Id. at 146.
123. Id. at 155.
124. Id. at 149–51.
125. Id. at 147.
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From the recipient’s point of view, indeed,the repeat player referrer is more significant than the one-shot client.126 Not surprisingly, the likelihood of referral
varies directly with the size of the case.127 As one lawyer explained: “something
that goes into” the decision to refer “is whether there is enough of a fee available
for us to bring in another law firm.”128 Although the percentage of the contingent fee paid to the referrer varies, it tends to do so by case category and referral
partner rather than by individual case.129
Parikh’s thick description of actual referral practices amply demonstrates
that they do not optimize client interest. Referrers choose recipients for many
reasons other than expertise: friendship, mentoring, convenience, pay, gifts, or
reciprocity. Many referrers know little about the recipient’s expertise and even
less about how it compares with the rest of the plaintiffs’ bar. Once lawyers
establish such a relationship they tend not to reevaluate it. Some lawyers do little
more than refer — a function that could be performed far more cheaply by nonlawyers, and arguably better. Recipients feel greater loyalty to referrers than to
their clients. The likelihood of referral is related to case size, not need. There is
little or no competition to drive down the price of referral services. And the fact
that recipients have to pay one-third to one-half of the contingent fee to referrers
may be part of the reason why that fee itself is a third to a half of damages.
D. Financing Clients
That leaves me with speculations about innovative market devices. Could
clients borrow against or securitize their claims? Ethical rules forbid lawyers
from lending to clients,130 but most jurisdictions that have opined on the issue
126. The same is true of intermediaries for pro bono clients. See generally Philip R. Lochner, The No-Fee

and Low-Fee Legal Practice of Private Attorneys, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 431 (1975) (providing a
sociological analysis of reasons why lawyers take pro bono clients).
127. Parikh, supra note 32, at 123; Spurr, supra note 99, at 244–45.
128. Parikh, supra note 32, at 140–41.
129. Id. at 159–60.
130. MODEL RULES

OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2002). A 1981 draft of the 1983 Model Rules would
have allowed lawyers to advance living expenses to prevent clients from being forced to accept inadequate
settlements, but this was rejected. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(3) (1981) with
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48(2) (1996). See James E. Moliterno,
Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The ‘Acquisition of an Interest and Financial Assistance in
Litigation’ Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223, 234–239 (2003); see also Jack P. Stahl, The Cost of
Humanitarian Assistance: Ethical Rules and the First Amendment, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 795, 807
(2003). A number of states allow limited exceptions: CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-210(a)(2)
(2006) (written loan agreement); ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2006) (emergency financial assistance); MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2005) (reasonable and necessary medical
and living expenses); TEX. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d) (1989) (reasonable and necessary
medical and living expenses ); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2005) (lawyers can
guarantee a bank loan necessary to avoid settlement “because of financial hardship rather than on the
merits”); see also MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2006); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2006).
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allow lawyers to advise clients about other sources of finance.131 Starting in the
1980s, several found ways to circumvent older prohibitions against maintenance,
champerty, and barratry.132 The first litigants to seek finance were not personal
injury victims but businesses: a patent infringement case against Parker Brothers’ “Masterpiece” game;133 a restaurant suing its shopping mall landlord over
the lease;134 a bad-faith insurance defense claim by a garage;135 a thirty-year
fight over patent rights to the optical laser;136 the refusal to honor an agreement
to convert a loan into an equity interest;137 a waterbed patent infringement
claim;138 a computer program patent infringement claim.139 Although plaintiffs’
lawyers naturally favor such financing, defendants and their advocates predictably objected that it increased litigiousness.140 Loans could allow clients to hire
lawyers at an hourly rate rather than a contingent fee (which often would be to
the client’s advantage),141 but this does not seem to have happened.
131. Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEP AUL BUS. &

COM. L.J. 85, 96–97 (2002).
132. See generally Donald L. Abraham, Investor-Financed Lawsuits: A Proposal to Remove Two Barri-

ers to an Alternative Form of Litigation Financing, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1297 (1992); Ari Dobner,
Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1995); Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 57 (1999); Susan
Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?, 30 AM. BUS.
L.J. 485 (1992); Martin, supra note 131.
133. See A Scheme to Sell Pieces of an Action, BUS. WK., May 24, 1976, at 35; Firm Born to Fight

Corporate Ills Dies of Cash Malnutrition, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1976, at 20; Public is Cool to
Lawsuit Stock, 63 A.B.A.J. 166 (1977); Two Characters in Search of Some Scratch, F ORTUNE, June
1977, at 91. The venture failed for lack of interested investors.
134. Eric Freedman, They Scan Docket Sheets Instead of the Stock Tables, 18 NAT’L L.J., Apr. 15, 1996,

at B1 (discussing Judgment Purchase’s investment in the claim).
135. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Large Verdicts for Sale: Plaintiffs Sell Portions of Million-Dollar Judgments

to Weather Long Appeals, 20 NAT’L L.J., Jan. 11, 1989, at A1.
136. Daniel C. Cox, Comment, Lawsuit Syndication: An Investment Opportunity in Legal Grievances, 35

ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 153, 156, 166 (1990).
137. Killian v. Millard, 279 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
138. Intex Plastics Sales Co. v. Hall, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Edmund L. Andrews,

Patents: Financing Inventors’ Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1989, at 36.
139. Linda Himelstein, Investors Wanted — For Lawsuits, BUS. WK., Nov. 15, 1993, at 78.
140. George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation Funding Industry: How Much Justice Can You

Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 833 (2001); Catherine Yang, Psst! Wanna Buy a Lawsuit?,
F ORBES, May 19, 1986, at 67. Michael Epstein, a partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges who defends
patent infringement lawsuits, was an unsurprising source of criticism in two separate articles. See Himelstein, supra note 139, at 78; Andrews, supra note 138, at 36.
141. Roy D. Simon, Jr., Lawsuit Syndication: Buying Stock in Justice, 69 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 10, 11

(1989). One lawyer “bluntly” told Herbert Kritzer: “I’m in contingency fee cases to beat my hourly rate.”
KRITZER, supra note 19, at 75. After an exhaustive analysis of his own data, Kritzer concluded that:
[I]t is a small subset of cases, typically the top ten percent, that produce the largest profits. However, the typical contingency fee practitioner can expect even the remaining 90 percent of cases as
a portfolio to produce a fee premium on the order of twenty-five to thirty percent of what marketrate hourly fee work generates.
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In the last fifteen years, litigation lenders have proliferated and now target
personal injury victims almost exclusively. Unfortunately, the market’s persistent
imperfections seriously disadvantage borrowers. (Litigation lending resembles
payday loans and check cashing facilities in poor communities.) Like plaintiffs’
lawyers’ fees, almost all of these loans are contingent on success, with no obligation to repay either interest (or fee) or capital if there is no recovery. As such,
they are exempt from usury laws.142 But like contingent fee lawyers,143 these
contingent litigation lenders also do not compete in price. Most reveal little or
nothing about the cost of their loans, making it extremely difficult for personal
injury victims to compare prices or even understand the terms of the transaction
before they are committed to it. LawFinance Group explicitly declines to explain
how it prices loans when judgments are on appeal.144 “LawFinance Group has
no single pricing formula when it comes to making an AppealFinance investment in a money judgment on appeal. Each funding decision is made on a caseby-case basis.”145 Plaintiff Support Services (“PSS”) discloses only its $350
“processing fee” before retreating behind the statement that “each case is judged
on its own merits and PSS carefully considers such issues as likelihood of success,
damages sustained, risk of loss of PSS’ funds, settlement possibilities and time of
potential recovery.”146 It urges lawyers to “be wary of other companies offering
to provide services similar to PSS. When comparing, you’ll find that PSS provides by far the lowest cost of funds in our industry.”147 At the same time, however, it makes such comparisons almost impossible because it provides such scant
information about its cost formula. National Lawsuit Funding says only that its
loans “are based upon the potential value of your pending lawsuit.”148 Lawsuit
Financial Corp. never mentions cost among its twelve “FAQs.”149 Whitehaven
Id. at 218. This was consistent with two other studies.
142. This is true only if there is a real contingency. A New York court recently found no meaningful contin-

gency in such a loan and invalidated it as usurious. Anthony J. Sebok, What Is Wrong with Investing in
Litigation? (Mar. 2006) (unpublished article, on file with author).
143. In New York, the Appellate Division, First Department created a maximum fee schedule to serve as a

guide for setting attorneys’ fees. ROSENTHAL, supra note 27, at 35. However, the maximum contingent
fee allowed by law quickly became the minimum as well. KRITZER, supra note 19, at 39–42, describes
how in Wisconsin he found that sixty percent of contingent fees were one-third and thirty-one percent of
contingent fees were at a variable percentage, usually between twenty-five and fifty. But Kritzer conceded he had “no evidence that indicates that the variation reflects market competition” or that “potential
clients have any idea that there may be alternatives available or that they ‘shop’ for the best arrangement.” Id. at 42.
144. LawFinance Group, http://www.lawfinance.com/solutions_appeal.php (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
145. Id.
146. Plaintiff Support Services, FAQ, http://www.plaintiffsupport.com/faq.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
147. Id.
148. National Lawsuit Funding, http://www.nationallawsuitfunding.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
149. Lawsuit Financial Corp., Frequently Asked Questions, http:/www.lawsuitfinancial.com/faqs.html (last

visited Sept. 6, 2006).
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Funding’s twelve “Frequent Questions” state only that there are “no hidden or
up-front fees” but say nothing about its interest rate.150 HSAC Funding
promises “no hidden fees” but then adds cryptically that “our fee is calculated as a
discount on the total settlement amounts we receive. . . .”151 CapTran presents
numerous case histories, client testimonials, and legal ethical opinions authorizing its practices.152 But its “Sixteen FAQs” say nothing about its fees. “We are
happy to review your case . . . and tell you the amount of investment fee we
would require.” American Asset Finance offers a “free quote online” but only
after the applicant has completed a detailed three-page form describing the accident and has submitted the full case file.153 Case Funding boasts that “applying
is free” but cautions that “there may be” (as though this were uncertain) “a
processing or origination fee” (amount unspecified) “included in the approved advance” (and thus hidden). Successful clients must repay “upfront costs” (unclear
whether this is more than the loan amount) “plus a ‘usage’ fee” specified in “a
schedule . . . attached to your contract . . . . Once your case has been reviewed
and approved” Case Funding “will be more than happy to go over the fees,”
which are “higher than interest rates charged by credit card companies because of
the risks we take.”154
But do these lenders incur any real risks (much less high ones)? Although the
plaintiffs’ bar endlessly justifies its 25–50% contingent fee by reference to lost
cases, there is reason for skepticism.155 Selectivity in the acceptance of clients
suggests that lawyers winnow out most risk. Kritzer found that the eighty percent of his Wisconsin firms that had been contacted by fewer than seventy-six
potential clients the previous year accepted just half of those cases; the eighteen
percent of firms contacted by 76–1000 potential clients accepted a little over a
third of the cases; and the one percent of firms contacted by more than a thousand
potential clients accepted only eight percent of those cases.156 Parikh reports almost the same profile among her Chicago respondents: the eight percent who
were “low-end” practitioners accepted forty-nine percent of the cases; the nineteen
percent who were high end accepted thirty-six percent of the cases; and the one
percent of elite firms accepted just twenty-four percent of the cases.157 Daniels
and Martin found even lower acceptance rates in Texas, ranging between thirty150. Whitehaven Funding, http://www.whitehavendirect.com/General/faq#Q9 (last visted Sept. 6, 2006).
151. HSAC Funding, http://hsacfunding.com/plaintiffs (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
152. Captran, http://www.captran.com (last visited Apr. 29, 2006).
153. American Asset Finance, http://www.amasset.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
154. Case Funding, http://www.casefunding.com/faqs.htm#upfrontFees (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
155. Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Den-

mark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 107 (1989). See generally LESTER BRICKMAN, MICHAEL HOROWITZ &
J EFFREY O’CONNELL, RETHINKING CONTINGENT FEES (1994).
156. K RITZER, supra note 19, at 72.
157. Parikh, supra note 32, at 78.
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five percent and sixteen percent.158 Litigation lenders seem at least as risk adverse. LawFinance Group, Inc. accepted only ten percent of loan applicants. The
CEO of ExpertFunding.com claimed that only 2% of the 500 who borrowed in
2000 failed to repay.159 The president of Judgment Purchase Corp. boasted it
had profited in ninety percent of the forty cases it accepted.160
Some idea of the magnitude of lenders’ charges can be gleaned from reports
of individual loans. Future Settlement Funding Corporation and Interim Settlement Funding Corporation (related companies) made two loans, one for
$6,000 and another one for $1,000 to Roberta Rancman, the victim of an uninsured drunk driver, who was suing her own insurer (a relatively low-risk claim).
Her obligation to repay varied with the time to settlement: $16,800 in 12
months, $22,200 in 18 months, and $27,600 in 24 months.161 The court found
that the lowest possible annual interest rates on the two loans were 280% and
180%, respectively.162
A Florida lawyer reported a funding company that offered an $8,000 advance against a repayment of $25,000 within a year, a 162% return.163
Anthony J. Sebok describes an agreement by Anglo-Dutch Petroleum to borrow
$560,000 in return for paying Law Funds LLC $2.5 million if it won its lawsuit against Halliburton. Even if this took four years, the interest was nearly
four times the principal, or almost 100% annually.164 Judgment Purchase Corporation (“JPC” — a subsidiary of LawFinance Group) suggested it would pay
$100,000 for a 25% stake in an anticipated $1 million judgment (being contested
on appeal).165 Its 150% total return would have to be annualized for the years it
took to execute judgment.166 General Electric Capital Corporation paid Lot$off
$5.8 million for a $10 million share in a $151 million judgment against Chase
Manhattan Bank.167 Again, the nearly 100% rate of return would have to be
158. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The

Precarious Nature of Plaintiff’s Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1789 (2002).
159. Mike France, The Litigation Machine, BUS. WK., Jan. 29, 2001, at 114.
160. Jennifer Huie, Sell Futures in Your Verdict, BUS. WK., Sept. 8, 1997, at 8. On the other hand, Ex-

pertFunding.com was no longer in existence in 2006; neither were four others mentioned in Martin,
supra note 131, at 99–100. Other groups like Cashfactory.com are still in existence.
161. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St.3d 121 (Ohio App. Dist. 2001); Martin,

supra note 131, at 92.
162. Rancman, 99 Ohio St.3d at 124–25.
163. Jean Hellwege, David v. Goliath Revisited: Funding Companies Help Level the Litigation Playing

Field, TRIAL, May 1, 2001, at 14.
164. Sebok, supra note 142.
165. Reynolds Holding, Investing in Other People’s Lawsuits, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 12, 1996, at B1.
166. 50-Off Stores, Inc. v. Banque Paribas (Suisse) S.A., Civil SA-95-CA, 1997 WL 790739 (W.D. Tex. May

20, 1997).
167. Fisk, supra note 135, at A1; see also Bruce Rubenstein, Company Sells Shares in Jury Award as

Appeal Hedge, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1998, at 32.
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annualized. Pacific Group won an $8.6 million compensatory damage judgment
against U.S. Hotel in a contract action. When the latter appealed, Pacific Group
borrowed $70,000 from JPC, repaying $140,000 when U.S. Hotel settled for $3
million more than a year later (an annual interest rate of just under 100%).168
An auto body shop owner won a $26.4 million verdict against Travelers Indemnity for bad faith failure to represent. In order to resist the appeal the plaintiff
auto body shop owner borrowed from LawFinance Group “in the low six figures”
with a promise to repay twice as much if he won (as he did).169 Although these
cases suggest that business plaintiffs, which usually have other sources of finance,
better information, and greater financial sophistication, can obtain better rates
than individuals, even if they are paying interest on the order of 100% a year.
Advance Cost & Settlement Funding (“ACSF”) is more explicit than other
lenders about “THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION — How much will it
cost upon the successful conclusion of my case?”170 Its rates depend “on our evaluation of your case — the better the case the lower the rate.” In addition to “a small
administrative charge . . . to cover the cost of document preparation, monitoring,
filing fees, etc.,” rates “typically are anywhere from 3% to 5% per month, compounded monthly . . . .”171 (Translated into annualized percentage rates, five
percent compounded monthly becomes 80% for one year, 112% for two, 160% for
three, 235% for four, and 354% for five). This lender continues: “Unlike other
funding companies ACSF has a LOW RATE GUARANTEE. ACSF guarantees to
beat any rate of any other funding company, as contained in a written proposal,
in cases which it funds.” Either these extraordinary interest rates are less than
those charged by competitors, or few tort victims are willing or able to submit
their cases to multiple lenders in order to obtain comparative quotations.
LawMax Legal Finance promises “Rates as low as 3.95% month” (without indicating whether that is compounded — as it almost certainly is).172 Oasis Legal
Finance, which brags that it is “the most active company in pre-settlement funding,” offers as “typical models” a lump sum repayment that represents 60% interest for one year, 50% a year for two, 662/3% a year for three, and 86% a year for
3.5 years.173 For judgments on appeal it charges 35% for the first year and 25%
a year for two years. It calls these terms “simple and straightforward.”
168. Huie, supra note 160, at 8.
169. Hellwege, supra note 163, at 18.
170. Advance Cost & Settlement Funding, Litigation Loan Guarantee for Lawsuit Advance Funding, http://

www.acsfcorp.com/howItWorks/rateGuarantee.cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
171. Id.
172. Fund My Case, http://www.fundmycase.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006); Resolution Settlement, http://

www.resolutionsettlement.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006); American Cash Flow, http://www.american
cashflow.com/rjcapital (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
173. Oasis Legal Finance, Pre-Settlement Funding from Oasis Legal Finance, http://www.oasislegal.com/

plaintiff_pricing.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
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A few lenders admit their interest rates are far higher than those charged for
mortgages or even credit cards. Legal Funding Group claims to
work diligently to educate the client that even at the lowest rate possible, a non-recourse cash advance is expensive and should only be used
as a last resort. Be aware that the Lawsuit Financing industry is full
of part timers and very expensive advance operations. Some companies charge an automatic 100% of the advance amount; some charge
15% a month etc. Some even demand a portion of the settlement in
addition to the advance amount and fees!
The ones that advertise low rates are simply adding larger front loaded
one-time fees. For example, in place of a 10% origination fee — they
will charge a 20% origination fee and knock off a 1/2 point on the
monthly fees, hardly a bargain. In other cases they are doubling up on
application fees.
Our fee structure includes a flat one-time application fee that ranges
from $250.00–$350.00. A one-time origination fee of 10% of the gross
funding amount. Our monthly compounding fees range from 3.0 to as
high as 8.9%.174

Hence in addition to the $350 “application fee” and 10% “origination fee” the
borrower will pay as much as 179% for one year, 338% for two years, 688% for
three years, 1483% for four years, and 3343% for five years! I can see why they
warn clients away from lower-cost competitors.
Law Capital Enterprises promises “competitive pricing.” “As every case is
different, rates charged will vary with the type of case and may include a
monthly compounding fee (2.50–4.99%) until your case settles or a flat fee.” (I
calculated above the annualized equivalent of 5% compounded monthly.) The
variables are “type of case, liability, how long your case has been in progress,
insurance coverage and damages.” It makes a “low cost guarantee” to “meet or
beat the offer or pay you $100.00.” But though it claims to “offer you some of the
lowest rates in the industry,” it concedes that “legal funding advances are expensive when compared with many other forms of financing. Accordingly, we highly
recommend that you first try less expensive resources such as banks, credit cards or
family and friends before trying our service.”175 In other words, only the truly
desperate will pay such extortionate interest rates. LawCash concurs.
Is this expensive? Yes. LawCash advises that if you have any other
alternative means to meet your immediate economic needs you should
do so. LawCash is taking a high risk in providing funding based on

174. Legal Funding Group, Legal Funding Fees, http://www.legalfundinggroup.com/fees.php (last visited

Sept. 25, 2006).
175. Law Capital Enterprises, http://www.lawcapital.net (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).

370

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-2\NLR204.txt

unknown

Seq: 29

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

9-MAR-07

16:11

VOLUME 51  2006/07

the future value of your pending personal injury case. Our costs usually range between 2 to 4 percent with an application fee.176

But “2 to 4 percent” a what? A month? Simple or compounded? LawCash does
not say. And the practice of competitors suggests the risk is low.
In 2001 Roy Simon declared that the “solution” to the danger that “sophisticated buyers of claims [would] pay too little to people who don’t know the value of
their claims . . . lies in the marketplace. Once syndication becomes a common
business, claim holders can shop around and compare prices, selling to the highest
bidder.”177 The following year Susan Martin asserted that “there are now so
many companies in the litigation financing business that they will be forced by
the market into more competitive pricing.”178 Like so many deductions from the
axiom of market rationality, these predictions are far too optimistic.
E. Financing Lawyers
There is a related, but distinct, market for litigation loans to lawyers who
are more sophisticated than clients in purchasing financial services, have more
alternative sources of capital, and suffer less urgent need.179 Counsel Financial
Services, which proclaims itself “the largest provider of attorney funding in the
United States,” offers loans up to $15 million.180 They aggressively tout two
years of interest-only payments and assure lawyers that “loan interest is 100%
tax deductible” and “in most states, financing charges on behalf of client expenses
can be charged back to the client.”181 But they scrupulously avoid disclosing their
interest rates.182 Advocate Capital is even more evasive:
What does it cost?
If implemented properly, the cost to your firm is next to nothing. In
addition to our rates being very reasonable, our services enable your
firm to get reimbursed from your cases for 100% of the cost of our
services. So the net cost to your firm is close to zero.
Our rates float with the Prime Lending Rate as published in the Wall
Street Journal. Although we don’t publish our pricing online, you can
176. Law Cash, http://www.lawcash.net/faq/faq.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
177. Simon, supra note 113, at 11–12.
178. Martin, supra note 131, at 101.
179. But legal professions have denied themselves some sources of financing by prohibiting lawyers from form-

ing partnerships with non-lawyers or selling them equity interests in their firms.
180. Counselfin, http://www.counselfin.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
181. See, e.g., Chittenden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 So.2d 1140 (La. 2001); Ohio Bd. Com.

Griev. Disp., Ohio Sup. Ct Ethics Op. 2001-3 (2001); Ariz. State Bar Comm. on Rules of Prof. Conduct,
Op. 2001-07 (2001).
182. The same is true for Law Finance Group. Law Finance, Firm Finance Pricing, http://www.lawfinance.

com/firm-pricing.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
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click here to request a detailed proposal for your firm including exact
costs.183

“[F]loat with the Prime” (aside from evoking Muhammad Ali) suggests that the
two are about the same, but of course Advocate Capital’s rates are much higher;
they just fluctuate with the Prime. Oasis Legal Finance writes opaquely of “negotiable terms.” But CEO Gary Chodes (a former plaintiff’s lawyer) said “we’re
priced closer to venture capital than a bank loan.”184 A solo practitioner who
won a $152 million verdict on behalf of 600 minority police officers suing Los
Angeles County for discrimination was paying Oasis thirty-seven percent annually on her million dollar loan while she resisted the appeal. Even capped at three
years, this was $1.21 million in interest for a $1 million dollar loan. Loans to
lawyers are big business: three lenders claim to have advanced at least $100
million each.185 And since, as the lenders boast, it is clients who ultimately foot
the bill, some will end up paying extortionate interest rates for their own loans
and their lawyers’ loans (as well as their lawyers’ contingent fees, inflated by any
referral fees). As in “Bleak House,” lawyers and lenders may consume the entire
award. 186
F. Brokering Finance
Could brokers reduce some of these market imperfections?187 This is a
workable solution only if market forced brokers to demonstrate their independence from lenders. That several lenders actively encourage brokers and offer
advice about how to become one188 suggests the potential for capture (as well as
for the generation of more business). Oasis Legal Finance, for instance, claims to
pay “generously” — “the highest commissions in the industry” — for referrals of
both plaintiffs and lawyers needing litigation loans.189 For Oasis Legal Finance,
the “numbers tell the story”:
183. Advocate Capital, http://www.advocatecapital.com/about.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
184. Oasis Legal, Cash Loan Information from Oasis Legal, http://www.oasislegal.com/attorney_limitedre-

course.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
185. Alison Frankel, Helping Underfunded Plaintiff’s Lawyers — at a Price, AM. LAW, Feb. 13, 2006,

available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1139565913200.
186. A client who had borrowed $200,000 in exchange for a promise to repay $600,000 rejected a $1 million

settlement because it was insufficient to repay the loan and the contingent fee. When the case was lost at
trial the lawyer sued for tortious interference with contract, fraud, and unfair trade practices. A federal
court denied a motion to dismiss. Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d
448 (W.D.N.C. 2001).
187. Simon, supra note 114, at 10.
188. See, e.g., National Lawsuit Funding, http://www.nationalawsuitfunding.com (last visited Sept. 25,

2006); Case Funding, http://www.casefunding.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
189. Oasis Legal, Settlement Loan Funding is Available From Oasis Legal Finance, http://

www.oasislegal.com/referral_opportunities.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
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Nationwide, less than 1,000 brokers make referrals for settlement
loans.
There are 10,000,000 lawsuits in the legal system at any one time.
30% of the cases either don’t qualify or have been resolved.
There are 3,250,000 new civil lawsuits each year, which keeps the
number at approximately 10,000,000.
An overwhelming 90% of all qualified lawsuit plaintiffs have not been
approached about a settlement loan.
That means the market has 9,000,000 plaintiffs needing to be contacted
regarding a settlement loan.

Are brokers likely to warn tort victims that litigation loans are extraordiniarly
expensive — thereby jeopardizing their chance for a “generous” commission?
Will they even be motivated to steer clients to the cheapest lender?190
G.

A Claims Market

Sale of part or all of the claim would give clients the discounted present
value of the future probability of recovery.191 Lawyers would be the likeliest
buyers. But most jurisdictions prohibit the sale or assignment of personal injury
claims as well as lawyer solicitation.192 In the early twentieth century, Texas
allowed such transactions, and even permitted non-lawyer solicitation. For at
least two decades after World War I, Frank McCloskey bought tort actions, at one
point owning sixty percent of all pending claims against the San Antonio Traction Company (the local streetcar).193 But this would be legally impossible today.
Even if it were allowed, lenders, investors, and buyers would face problems in
evaluating the worth of claims (which victims are interested in exaggerating).
And all would confront the moral hazard of victims losing interest in pursuing
their claims vigorously (a risk that could only be reduced, not eliminated, by fiduciary duties and a mandatory residual financial interest). Without an effective
national registration scheme, there could also be confusion about title and the
danger of victims transacting with multiple lenders and buyers.
Could the internet help rationalize market relations between clients and
lawyers? Martindale-Hubbell, for example, has created a site where clients with
questions about their potential claims can describe their accidents and injuries.194
190. Id.
191. See Simon, supra note 141, at 10. See generally Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market

Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 435 (1995); Cox, supra note 136; Marc J. Shukaitis, A
Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1987).
192. However, they can purchase accounts receivable and sue on them. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l

Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-416 (2000).
193. Shukaitis, supra note 191, at 342–43.
194. Community Lawyers, http://communitylawyers.com/messageboards (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
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But the replies come from laypeople — indeed, the same few individuals, apparently with nothing better to do than surf the site — and are generally unhelpful.
Martindale also hosts chat rooms: laypeople can submit questions in advance and
get a lawyer’s response. But personal injuries are discussed only every two weeks,
and many victims will not wait that long for an initial response.195 Could lawyers post descriptions of past cases and bid for new ones on the internet? This
would most likely be impossible since there would be far too many serious
problems of confidentiality, accuracy, and reliability. Somehow I don’t think
plaintiffs and their lawyers are ready for e-Bay.
V.

WHO’S RESPONSIBLE?

Tort victims encounter many barriers to recovery. Lawyers should not be
blamed for some: lay ignorance; the widespread cultural stigma on claiming; both
realistic and exaggerated fear of retaliation by the defendant (employer, landlord,
relative); misrepresentations by for-profit referral services; litigation lenders’
anti-competitive practices.196 But though individual plaintiffs’ lawyers energetically champion their clients’ interests, the plaintiffs’ bar and other lawyer collectivities bear considerable responsibility for making it difficult and expensive for
victims to claim.
Plaintiffs face an informational disadvantage when pursuing their personal
injury claims. They lack sufficient information about the quality of lawyers and
are ill-served by referral schemes. The legal profession erects, defends, and raises
entry barriers without any evidence that these are essential to ensure minimum
quality or that the incremental quality gains exceed the access losses caused by
price increases. Furthermore, the legal profession prevents non-lawyers from advising and assisting victims, prosecuting the few foolish enough to defy the ban.
Lawyers discourage second opinions. Generalist lawyers resist specialist certification (or make it so easy to obtain as to render it meaningless). No jurisdiction
requires specialization. Lawyer referral schemes do not discriminate in terms of
quality. The legal profession prohibits lawyers from paying laypersons to refer
cases (ambulance chasing) but allows lawyers to pay other lawyers for doing so;
the unjustified one-third to one-half referral fee becomes another justification for
the one-third to one-half contingent fee. The profession forbids solicitation, a
mechanism far more efficient and effective than advertising in dealing with imperfect information.
The legal profession imposes a wide variety of restrictive practices, all of
which inflate prices for plaintiffs and/or otherwise disadvantage them. It prohibits victims from selling their causes of action and lawyers from advancing
195. Community Lawyers, http://communitylawyers.com/chat (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
196. See generally HAZEL GENN, PATHS

TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING
Law (1999) (analyzing how people decide to claim); Engel, supra note 8.
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money to clients, thereby preempting a source of competition that might drive
down the extortionate interest rates charged by litigation lenders. It forbids nonlawyers to invest in firms, denying them a source of capital. Bar rules limit
advertising of prices and results, which is part of the reason why the plaintiffs’
bar does not compete in the percentage charged for contingent fees. These fees are
higher than hourly rates, sometimes obscenely so. Although the plaintiffs’ bar
justifies the premium by reference to the risk of loss, most lawyers take few if any
losing cases. Personal injuries are excluded from legal aid and prepaid legal services to ensure that plaintiffs’ lawyers will continue to receive their contingent
fees. The legal profession subverted the workers’ compensation goal of making
lawyers superfluous and successfully resisted or effectively marginalized no-fault
automobile accident schemes.
Why do victims tolerate this? There are several causes, each of which would
be difficult to overcome. The first is the collective action problem. Before an
injury occurs, the prospect of injury is too incalculable and inchoate to motivate
anticipatory measures. Even after it happens, victims are dispersed, anonymous
strangers. Individually they lack economic and political clout, and the costs of
organizing them are enormous. Second, victims are extraordinarily vulnerable
and needy. An accident, by definition, is unplanned. Its consequences are traumatic: physically, financially, relationally, and emotionally. For most victims, it
is a unique experience. Even if they know other accident victims, those other
accident victims also can draw on only one incident. Third, tort damages are
found money. (In this they resemble inheritance, another situation where lawyers engage in shameless fee-gouging, and the sale of the marital residence following divorce.) Most Americans have no significant savings (other than the
illiquid equity in their homes, which many have reencumbered to refinance their
growing credit card debt). Tort involuntarily converts their human capital into
damages. Victims need to replace their lost earnings now (and hence are willing
to pay exorbitant interest rates for litigation loans). They need medical care now
(rendering the 45.8 million without insurance dependent on health care providers
willing to accept a lien on future recovery). But pain and suffering is gravy.
(Indeed, most victims only want a token payment that acknowledges their loss —
the Roman law “solatium.”)197 So victims passively let lawyers take most of it.
(Indeed, lawyers’ fees are one of the many unpersuasive rationalizations for pain
and suffering damages.)
What is to be done? The plaintiffs’ bar has a huge stake in preserving the
status quo. Victims cannot organize themselves into a force for change. Some
politicians have been happy to take money from the “tort reform” lobby (corporations, insurers, doctors), others from the plaintiffs’ bar, but neither interest group
represents victims. It would take a visionary to see and appeal to the constitu197. R OGER BRYANT HUNTING & GLORIA S. NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES

AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS 41–42, 91 (1962).
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ency of past and future personal injury victims (and their families and acquaintances) who want to see tort law continue to play its essential roles of
compensation, deterrence and punishment, without paying lawyers excessive fees
for tasks that laypeople could perform far more cheaply and probably better.
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